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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, Alaska's appellate courts routinely review and modify
criminal sentences under the authority of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.120(a), a statute that confers upon the appellate courts the
power to modify sentences found to be overly severe.1 Before passage
of that legislation in 1969, however, there was no statutory mechanism
by which a convicted defendant could have a severe but lawfully-im-
posed sentence reduced on appeal. 2 Prior to enactment of the sentence
review statute, Alaska's then-three supreme court justices struggled
with the basic question of whether the court had any common law or
constitutional authority to review and modify overly severe or lenient
criminal sentences that fall within statutory limits.3 After the sentence
review statute was passed, the supreme court, and later the Alaska
Court of Appeals, struggled with the more complicated issue of the
proper role for appellate courts in sentencing criminal defendants and
in creating sentencing policy.
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1. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) (1990).
2. Nor was there any statutory mechanism by which the state could appeal an
overly lenient sentence.
3. It was generally accepted that appellate courts had jurisdiction to review and
modify sentences that did not fall within the bounds established by statute for the
offense in question. See Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, 374 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1962).
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This article documents the development of sentence review case
law in Alaska. It traces the evolution of appellate sentencing law and
explains its relationship to presumptive sentencing and Alaska's ban
on plea bargaining. The discussion concludes with a review of how
Alaska's appellate courts, particularly the Alaska Court of Appeals,
have supplemented Alaska's presumptive sentencing statutes.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS: 1966-1968
Three opinions published between 1966 and 1968 demonstrate
how the justices differed in their approach to the issue: Justice Nesbett
categorically opposed sentence review, Justice Rabinowitz favored it,
and Justice Dimond vacillated between these two poles. The first of
these cases was State v. Pete.4 In Pete, the appellee had been found
guilty of two counts of unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment.5 The
district court had sentenced the defendant to the maximum one year
on each comt, with the sentences to run consecutively.6 On appeal,
Pete argued that his sentence should be reduced because it was illegal
or, in the alternative, that it was excessive.7
The supreme court rejected Pete's argument that his consecutive
sentences were illegal.3 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Nesbett and Jus-
tice Dimond voted to reduce his sentence to time served, stating that
"the two offenses were really part of one general transaction involving
the unlawful sale of liquor." 9 Justice Rabinowitz dissented from the
majority's decision to reduce the sentence, arguing that "this impor-
tant question relating to our appellate authority [to review sentences]
has not been adequately briefed."10
Not until two years later was the court prepared to squarely ad-
dress whether it had the authority to review and modify criminal
sentences. In Bear v. State," Justice Rabinowitz concluded that the
supreme court had jurisdiction to review criminal sentences,' 2 while
Chief Justice Nesbett and Justice Dimond, distinguishing their earlier
holding in Pete, concluded that the court did not have jurisdiction to
review a criminal sentence for an abuse of discretion.13
4. 420 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1966).
5. Id at 341.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 339.
8. Id. at 342.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 343 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11. 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968).
12. Id. at 437-38.
13. Id. at 435.
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The majority reasoned that without a statutory provision specifi-
cally conferring upon the appellate court authority to review criminal
sentences, the determination of the period of time that a convicted
defendant should serve was best left to the discretion of the trial judge
and to the State Board of Parole. 14 Justice Rabinowitz, dissenting,
pointed out that the court had already modified a sentence in Pete, and
argued that a logical construction of the constitutional grant of final
appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court permitted sentence
review. 15
In Faulkner v. State,16 Justice Dimond, who earlier that year had
refused to review Bear's sentence for an abuse of discretion, voted with
Justice Rabinowitz to vacate Faulkner's sentence, even though it was
within the limits of a valid statute. Faulkner had been sentenced to
thirty-six years in prison on his plea of guilty to eight counts involving
bad checks. 17 Both Justice Dimond and Justice Rabinowitz agreed
that this sentence was too severe and should be vacated; however, they
could not agree on a legal theory for their result.
Justice Dimond voted to vacate Faulkner's sentence on the
grounds that it was "so 'disproportionate to the offense committed'"
that it amounted to a violation of the constitutional ban against cruel
and unusual punishment.' Justice Rabinowitz, reiterating the views
he had expressed in his dissent in Bear, voted to vacate on the grounds
that the trial court had abused its discretion and had imposed an ex-
cessive sentence; however, he did not share Justice Dimond's view that
the sentence violated the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual
punishment.' 9 Chief Justice Nesbett disagreed with both of his col-
leagues, arguing in dissent that the cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibition could not be used to vacate a sentence within the limits of a
valid statute, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to review a
criminal sentence for abuse of discretion.20
Clearly, the issue was a difficult one for the court. When faced
with an unusually harsh sentence, two of the three justices felt com-
pelled to act; yet only one of the three was willing to open the door to
wholesale sentence review.
14. Id. at 436.
15. Id. at 439 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
16. 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968).
17. Id. at 817.
18. Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 822, 830.
20. Id. at 825-26 (Nesbett, C.J., dissenting).
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III. NATIONAL TRENDS: THE RISE OF APPELLATE SENTENCE
REVIEW AS A GOAL OF SENTENCE REFORM
Alaska's appellate court was not alone in its reluctance to review
criminal sentences. Nationwide, few appellate courts had accepted
sentence review jurisdiction without specific statutory authorization.21
There were several legal and policy arguments against sentence review.
Some state courts, including the Alaska Supreme Court, held that re-
viewing sentences would improperly interfere, or seem to interfere,
with the traditional power of the executive branch to modify
sentences.22 Other appellate courts felt that the trial judge was better
able to fashion an appropriate sentence because the trial judge directly
observes the behavior and demeanor of the offender.23 Many judges
simply feared that appellate sentence review would generate a flood of
appeals that would render their caseloads unmanageable.24
Many sentencing laws in effect in the United States during the
1950s and the 1960s were indeterminate; they gave judges broad dis-
cretion to choose any sentence below the statutory maximum penalty
for a given crime, and contained no articulated criteria for choosing
the sentence or the release date.25 For example, under former Alaska
law, trial judges had discretion to choose both the type of sentence
and, within extremely broad statutory minimums and maximums, the
length of the sentence; but the statutes were silent as to what factors
the judge should consider in pronouncing sentence.26 The broad judi-
cial discretion and lack of articulated sentencing criteria - typical of
indeterminate statutes - were justified by rehabilitative purposes: "to
enable judges and parole officials familiar with the case to choose a
disposition tailored to the offender's need for treatment. '27
21. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 126, at 386 (1978).
22. Id. at 387; Bear, 439 P.2d at 434. In England at common law, "the chief
variations in punishments lay more in the methods by which an offender was to be
executed than in any other respect; the role of the judiciary being to determine the
question of guilt and to enter judgment." Id. After judgment had been entered, the
"penalties of the law were exacted as a matter of course, unless a royal pardon was
forthcoming." Id
23. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 386.
24. Ozanne, Judicial Review: 4 Case for Sentencing Guidelines and Just Deserts,
in 17 SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DISPARITY 177, 179 (M.
Forst ed. 1982).
25. Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in THE SENTENCING COM-
MISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 16, 17 (1987).
26. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.05.010-.060, 11.75.110 (1962) (repealed 1978).
27. Von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 3. See also Forst, Sentencing
Disparity: An Overview of Research and Issues, in SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERI-
MENTS IN REDUCING DISPARITY, supra note 24, at 16.
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By the mid-1970s, however, commentators were beginning to
criticize unregulated sentencing discretion.28 Critics objected to the
fact that unregulated authority to sentence allows judges to decide
similar cases differently.29 Other commentators were skeptical about
the value of rehabilitation as a primary goal of sentencing theory.3 0
With the decline of the rehabilitative model in the United States came
the rise of other sentencing models.31
The two most prominent of these models are the "just deserts"
and the "incapacitation" models. The just deserts model of sentencing
philosophy requires that the offender's sentence "comport with the
gravity of his criminal conduct."'3 2 The incapacitation model empha-
sizes imprisoning offenders whose "early criminal records and social
histories suggest they are likely to return to crime.133 In contrast to
the rehabilitative model, which is suited to a system of indeterminate
sentencing, both of these models lend themselves to a system of ex-
plicit standards for sentencing.3 4
Both disenchantment with the rehabilitative model and concern
over unjustified sentence disparity resulted in a growing consensus in
the late 1970s that regulating judges' sentencing discretion would be a
28. Von Hirsch, supra note 27, at 3.
29. Id at 4. Deciding cases differently results in sentence disparity. Sentence
disparity is generally defined as "differences in dispositions that cannot be explained
by relevant characteristics of the offense or the offender." Hanrahan & Greer, Crimi-
nal Code Revision and the Issue of Disparity, in 17 SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERI-
MENTS IN REDUCING DIsPARITY, supra note 24, at 36. Hanrahan and Greer explain
that sentence parity, "the idea that offenders convicted of similar crimes should re-
ceive roughly the same punishment" is universally appealing because "even philosoph-
ically or politically diverse groups can agree that deviations from some sentencing
norm are undesirable." Id. Disagreement arises because such groups have different
views on how to define that norm. Id.
30. The rehabilitative model of punishment was criticized on two fronts. First,
mounting evidence was beginning to show that rehabilitative programs did not have a
measurable effect on recidivism. Some felt it was a waste of taxpayers' money to fund
programs that did not reduce crime, and some thought it was unfair for prisoners to
participate in intrusive therapeutic programs that had no practical effect. Second,
people began to question the fairness of the rehabilitative model itself: is it fair to
make the severity of the offender's penalty depend on the offender's perceived need for
treatment, instead of on the seriousness of his offense? Von Hirsch, supra note 27, at
3-4; Forst, supra note 27, at 18-19.
31. Von Hirsch, supra note 27, at 4.
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id. Von Hirsch has explained that if criminal sanctions are to be based on the
seriousness of the offender's conduct, then uniform guidelines are needed to help
judges gauge the conduct's gravity and the appropriate, deserved penalty. If penalties
are to be based, instead, on the statistical probability of re-offending, then such




necessary part of sentence reform.35 Proponents of appellate review
argued that appellate judges could regulate trial court discretion in
two ways: they could review individual sentences, modifying those
found to be excessive or too lenient, and they could in the process
articulate standards and guidelines governing the imposition of crimi-
nal sanctions.3 6
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE GRANT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO
REVIEw SENTENCES: 1967-1969
In response to concerns about sentence reform, and to the Alaska
Supreme Court's decision in Bear, the Alaska Judicial Council called
in 1967 for the creation of a special statewide commission to study
sentencing. 37 The Sentencing Commission, composed of Judicial
Council members, lawyers, judges, civic leaders, legislators and others,
convened in Sitka, Alaska in December 1968.38
At the Sitka conference, committees were appointed to study pro-
bation, the Alaska Bar Association's model sentencing act, and appel-
late review of sentences. 39 In February 1969, the Judicial Council
recommended that the Alaska Legislature enact a statute giving the
Alaska Supreme Court jurisdiction to review sentences in serious
criminal cases.40
In April 1969, the Alaska Legislature enacted the recommended
sentence review statute. House Bill 281, as amended, passed unani-
mously, apparently with little discussion, in both the House and the
Senate. 41 The new law gave both the defendant and the state the right
to appeal a sentence to the supreme court. If the state appealed, how-
ever, the court could not increase the sentence, but could only approve
or disapprove it.42
35. Id. at 3-4.
36. Ozanne, supra note 24, at 178 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRO-
J=T ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 28-29 (1968)).
37. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FIFTH REPORT: 1967-1968, at 33 (1969).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 35.
40. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SIXTH REPORT: 1969-1970, at 4-5 (1971).
41. The vote. was 33 "Yeas" and no "Nays" in the House, and 19 "Yeas" and no
"Nays" in the Senate. H. JOURNAL, Sixth Leg., 1st Sess. 752 (Apr. 12, 1969); S.
JOURNAL, Sixth Leg., 1st Sess. 930 (May 1, 1969). The statute was originally enacted
as chapter 117, section 4 of the Alaska Session Laws of 1969. It was later codified at
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.120.
42. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(b) (1990).
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V. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF SENTENCING
LEGISLATION: 1970-1975
A. Sentencing Goals and Standards
The court first exercised its statutory duty to review trial court
sentences in State v. Chaney.4 3 The court in Chaney, in an opinion
written by Justice Rabinowitz, discussed the legislative intent of
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.120, and concluded that the primary
goal of the legislation was "to implement Alaska's constitutional man-
date that '[p]enal administration shall be based on the principle of ref-
ormation and upon the need for protecting the public.' "44
The court then translated this principle into concrete standards to
which the sentencing judge should refer when choosing a sanction.
Those standards, known as the Chaney factors, are:
rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society,
isolation of the offender from society to prevent criminal conduct
during the period of confinement, deterrence of the offender himself
after his release from confinement or other phenological treatment,
as well as deterrence of other members of the community who
might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to that of
the offender, and community condemnation of the individual of-
fender, or in other words, reaffirmation of societal norms for the
purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves.45
The companion case of Nicholas v. State,46 in an opinion by Jus-
tice Robert Erwin, is perhaps even more instructive than Chaney on
the subject of the supreme court's philosophical approach to sentenc-
ing and appellate sentence review. Justice Erwin's opinion in Nicholas
embraced the notion that the trial judge should have broad discretion
to choose an appropriate sanction. The court explicitly placed pri-
mary responsibility for sentencing in the hands of the trial judge.47 It
also stressed that sentencing should remain flexible in order to take
into account the facts of each crime, as well as the record and charac-
ter of each offender.48 The court refused to rank the Chaney goals in
order of importance, preferring instead to let the trial court "deter-
mine the priority and relationship of these objectives in any particular
case." 49
Nicholas clearly indicated that the supreme court did not consider
uniformity to be a significant goal of sentencing or of sentence review.
As Justice Erwin wrote, "reasonable disparity is necessary to achieve
43. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
44. Id. at 443 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12).
45. Id. at 444.
46. 477 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1970).
47. Id. at 449.




the purposes of sentencing .... [I]t is not the purpose of appellate
review to enforce uniformity or to chill initiative on the part of the
trial judge in attempting to arrive at a proper sentence."50
Consistent with Justice Erwin's mandate in Nicholas, the supreme
court fashioned a deferential standard of review for evaluating
sentences imposed by trial judges. In McClain v. State,51 the court
announced that it would conduct its own independent examination of
the record, but that it would not modify a sentence unless "convinced
that the sentencing court was clearly mistaken in imposing a particu-
lar sentence."'52 Over the next five years, the court used this "clearly
mistaken" standard to correct only the most serious sentencing dispar-
ities on appeal.5 3
B. The First Five Years of Sentence Review
In 197:5, Alaska Supreme Court Justice Robert Erwin surveyed
all sentence appeals the court had decided in its first five years of sen-
tence review. His survey confirmed that the supreme court had inter-
fered very little in the sentencing function. Justice Erwin reported
that the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision in approxi-
mately sixty-eight percent of the sixty sentence appeals it reviewed be-
tween 1970 and July 1, 1975.54
In only twenty percent of the sixty cases did the court actually
overturn the trial judge's sentencing decision.55 Of this twenty per-
cent, the court disapproved five percent (three sentences) as too leni-
ent, but lacked the power to increase those sentences.5 6 Thus, in only
fifteen percent of the cases (nine cases) did the court actually modify
the sentence or remand for resentencing.5 7
50. Id. at 448-49.
51. 519 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1974).
52. Id. at 813 (citing Chaney, 477 P.2d at 443-44). Before deciding McClain, the
court had also referred to its standard of review as the "zone of reasonableness" test.
Under this test, the reviewing court was to "determine whether the lower court im-
posed a sentence within the range of alternatives which comport with the Chaney
guidelines." It In McClain, the court concluded that the two tests were the same but
abandoned the "zone of reasonableness" language in order to prevent future confu-
sion. Id. at 813-14.
53. Stern, Presumptive Sentencing in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REv. 227, 257 n. 150
(1985).
54. Erwin, Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5 UCLA-ALAKA L. Rnv. 1,
3 (1975).
55. Id. In an additional 12% of cases, the supreme court reversed the trial court's





While unwilling to disturb many sentences, the supreme court did
exercise its appellate review authority to develop and articulate sen-
tencing criteria to guide trial judges. For example, in cases involving
violent crimes against people (assault, rape and homicide), the court
concluded that the nature of the offense should predominate over most
mitigating circumstances, leaving judges free to put heavy emphasis on
the Chaney goals of protecting society and reaffirming societal
norms.5 8 This was particularly true in the area of homicide, where the
court affirmed substantial sentences for offenders with no prior crimi-
nal records. 59
In cases involving drug offenders, the court developed four cate-
gories of offenses and explained that maximum terms of imprisonment
ordinarily should be reserved for the worst offenders. 6° The court fur-
ther suggested that factors such as the personal history and age of the
offender should play a larger role in drug cases than in violent cases. 61
For crimes against property, the court agreed with the American
Bar Association that sentences in excess of five years should be re-
stricted to particularly serious offenses, dangerous offenders and pro-
fessional criminals. 62 However, the court did recognize that robbery
involved somewhat different considerations than other crimes against
property because it posed a high risk of injury to the victim. 63 Thus,
for those property crimes not involving risk of physical injury to the
victim, the court felt that age, background and previous criminal his-
tory were important.64 However, for those property crimes involving
the risk of injury or death, the court affirmed substantial sentences
where violence occurred, where life was endangered or where prior
convictions indicated that the offender had not been deterred by lesser
sentences.
65
VI. IMPACT OF THE PLEA BARGAINING BAN, THE COURT OF
APPEALS, AND PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING ON
APPELLATE SENTENCE REVIEW: 1975-1980
A. The Plea Bargaining Ban and Sentence Appeal Filings
By 1975, filings of sentence appeals were on the rise. Although
the supreme court had decided only sixty sentence appeals during the
entire period from 1970 through June of 1975, twenty-two sentence
58. Id. at 5, 7.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 8-9.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Donlun v. State, 527 P.2d 472, 475 (Alaska 1974).
63. Erwin, supra note 54, at 13.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 13.
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appeals were filed in 1975 alone.66 Thirty-two sentence appeals were
filed in 1976, a thirty-nine percent increase from the previous year.67
In 1977, the number of sentence appeals jumped to sixty-three, a
103% increase from the previous year.68
This dramatic increase in sentence appeals can be largely ex-
plained by the effects of the 1975 ban on plea bargaining.69 The ban
greatly curtailed the frequency with which assistant district attorneys
made specific sentence recommendations.70 This documented de-
crease in sentence recommendations indicates that few post-ban de-
fendants pled guilty or nolo contendere in exchange for specific
sentence recommendations. Without specific sentence deals, post-ban
defendants were free to appeal the sentences they did receive.71 Thus,
66. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, at 2, Table I (1980). It is
important to recognize that the Court System's count of sentence appeals is underin-
clusive: a case is considered a sentence appeal only if it does not also include a merit




69. On August 15, 1975, then-Attorney General Avrum Gross officially banned
plea bargaining in Alaska. The Attorney General's policy prohibited all sentence rec-
ommendations by state prosecutors. Changing the charge or dismissing charges also
was prohibited if done solely to obtain a plea of guilty. Exceptions to the policy were
allowed in individual cases if approved by the Attorney General's office in advance.
M. RUBINSTEIN, T. WHITE & S. CLARKE, THE EFFECT OF THE OFFICIAL PROHIBI-
TION OF PLEA BARGAINING ON THE DISPOSITION OF FELONY CASES IN THE
ALASKA CRIMINAL COURTS 17-22 (December 1978).
The Alaska Judicial Council's study of the immediate effects of the ban found
that plea bargaining was substantially curtailed; although some "charge bargaining"
persisted in rural areas, sentence recommendations were virtually eliminated. Id. at
28-31. Later data suggested that the ban, although still officially in effect, may not
have been enforced quite as rigidly after mid-1978. Id. at 27-28; T. CARNS & J.
KRUSE, A RE-EvALUATION OF ALASKA'S BAN ON PLEA BARGAINING (Draft I), ch.
I ("Summary of Evidence Regarding the Existence of the Ban") (In Press).
The ban on plea bargaining was modified in 1980 by then-Attorney General Wil-
son Condon, and in 1986 it was significantly relaxed by then-Attorney General Harold
Brown. The Council's latest study of the ban suggests that by mid to late 1986 the
Attorney General's policy appeared to be "anemic at best in some attorneys' prac-
tices," although the prohibition did exist for many others. Evidence shows that the
prohibition applied most strongly to sentence bargaining, but that prosecutors "regu-
larly" engaged in charge bargaining. Id. at ch. I.
70. RUBINSTEIN, WHITE & CLARKE, supra note 69, at 111.
71. As a general rule, a defendant who pleads nolo contendere or guilty may ap-
peal his sentence. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) (1990) ("[a] sentence of impris-
onment lawfully imposed by the superior court for a term or for aggregate terms of
one year or more may be appealed to the court of appeals .... "). However, it is
unlikely that a defendant who had pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, and




the ban effectively increased the number of defendants able to file sen-
tence appeals by decreasing the number of defendants who had agreed
to their sentences in exchange for a plea.
The ban also changed the severity of sentences themselves. An
analysis of post-ban sentences shows that sentencing became more se-
vere for certain kinds of cases immediately after imposition of the
ban. 72 Harsher sentences most certainly increased the proportion of
defendants likely to appeal. Thus, imposition of the ban on plea bar-
gaining is probably a primary cause of the sentence appeal increases
noted in 1976 and 1977.
The Alaska Court System's 1979 Annual Report further shows
that criminal merit appeals also increased substantially after 1975,
although not as much as sentence appeals. From 1975 to 1976, there
was a fifty-eight percent increase. From 1976 to 1977, there was an
additional thirty percent increase.73
The 1975 to 1977 increase in criminal merit appeals might also be
tied to the ban on plea bargaining. After the ban, the number of crimi-
nal trials increased, as did the number of trial convictions as a percent-
age of all convictions.74 Of course, all defendants convicted at trial
were legally entitled to file merit appeals. 75 Assuming that the propor-
tion of defendants with the resources to file merit appeals remained
roughly constant from 1974 to 1976, the observed increase in criminal
72. RUBINSTEIN, WHrrE & CLARKE, supra note 69, at 111. Sentences became
harsher in two ways. First, the percentage of defendants likely to receive a jail sen-
tence increased significantly. This was true for all offenses taken as a group, and for
drug offenses in particular. Id. at Table VII-2. Sentence lengths also increased signifi-
cantly for "low-risk" property offenders, fraud offenders and drug offenders. Each of
these increases can be attributed to the ban. Sentence lengths continued to increase
substantially during the late 1970s for all offenses except drugs. The likelihood of a
jail sentence increased across the board. These increases were probably due in part to
the ban and in part to the nationwide emphasis on increased penalties for crime.
Sentences began to drop slightly in 1978 and 1979. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1976-1979, at 20, Table V (1980).
73. In contrast, civil appellate filings increased only slightly during this same
time. For example, from 1975 to 1976, civil appeals increased by 42%, compared to a
58% increase in criminal merit appeals. From 1976 to 1977, civil appeals increased
only 17%, compared to the 103% increase in sentence appeals and the 30% increase
in criminal merit appeals. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 66, at 2.
74. Alaska first experienced an increase both in trial rates and in the absolute
number of felony trials following adoption of the plea bargaining ban in 1975. Trial
rates remained high over the next five years. Trial convictions as a percentage of all
convictions also increased, from 8.5% before the ban to 15.3% in the year after the
ban, peaking at 22.4% in 1977, and dropping only slightly, to 21.8%, in 1978 then to
21.2% in 1979. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES: 1984,
at 64-65 (1987).
75. A defendant convicted at trial may appeal his conviction. ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.07.020(d) (1988). A defendant who pleads nolo contendere may also appeal his
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merit appeals could be related at least in part to the increase in trials
caused by the ban.76
B. Addition of the Court of Appeals
For the remainder of the decade, filings of criminal sentence and
merit appeals remained above 1976 levels, although they decreased
slightly from 1977 to 1978 and from 1978 to 1979. 77 In 1979, the
Alaska Court System published a special report showing that while
Alaska had the second highest number of appellate judges per 100,000
population in the nation, it also had in 1977 the third highest ratio of
appellate filings to size of population. 78
The Court System's report also showed that the supreme court's
backlog was increasing. On December 31, 1975, the court had 258
cases pending; one year later the number had risen to 391. By Decem-
ber 31, 1978, 624 cases were pending.79 Although in 1978 the court
was publishing almost twice as many opinions as it had been in 1975,
filings still exceeded dispositions every year.80
By the end of 1978, the supreme court had concluded that its
workload had exceeded its ability to decide cases in a reasoned and
timely manner. 81 To solve its workload problem, the court proposed
establishing am intermediate court of appeals in Alaska.
The supreme court recommended that the intermediate court
have limited subject matter jurisdiction, because projected fling trends
indicated that there would not be enough work for two courts of gen-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.8 2 The court of appeals' jurisdiction
conviction if his nolo plea was expressly conditioned upon the right to appeal one or
more substantive issues. Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974).
76. This analysis assumes that a defendant convicted at trial after the ban was not
significantly more likely to challenge the conviction than a defendant convicted in
1974. However, it is not necessarily clear that the proportion of defendants possessing
the resources to file merit appeals did remain constant during this time period. For
example, the growth of prepaid legal insurance plans for labor unions could have in-
creased some defendants' ability to afford merit appeals. These plans were relatively
common and influential in Alaska during the mid-to-late 1970s, mainly due to con-
struction of the TransAlaska Pipeline.
77. ALAsKA COURT SYSTEM, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at Table I,
at 2.
78. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, SUPREME COURT WORK-
LOAD: ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 56, 97-99 (1979). During 1977, one ap-
peal was filed in Alaska for every 589 residents. Id. at 99.
79. Id. at 6).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 56-57.
82. Id. at 104.
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was limited to criminal appeals,8 3 and the supreme court retained ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all civil appeals, with discretionary appeals
available from the court of appeals to the supreme court.84
There were three reasons to give the intermediate appellate court
jurisdiction over all criminal appeals. First, the clear distinction be-
tween civil and criminal appeals would eliminate time-consuming ju-
risdictional disputes. 5 Second, Alaska's historical ratio of civil and
criminal appellate filings suggested that the division of civil and crimi-
nal cases would give each court an equitable and reasonable work-
load.8 6 Third, it was felt that "a criminal appeal is much more likely
than a civil appeal to involve settled principles of law, with the only
issue being whether the lower court misapplied the law to the facts of
the case."8s7 This third rationale suggests that the court of appeals'
function originally was to be limited to simple correction of errors and
implies that the supreme court, by the exercise of its discretionary re-
view, would develop the substantive criminal law.
In 1980, the Alaska Legislature passed House Bill 104 as
amended. Codified at Alaska Statutes section 22.07, the law estab-
lished a three-judge court of appeals and gave it mandatory jurisdic-
tion in criminal and quasi-criminal matters,88 including sentence
appeals.8 9 The supreme court retained discretionary jurisdiction to re-
view final decisions of the court of appeals. 90
In July of 1980, Governor Jay Hammond appointed Alexander
Bryner, Robert Coats and James Singleton to serve on the newly-cre-
ated court. Alexander Bryner, the U.S. Attorney for Alaska, had also
been a district court judge and an assistant public defender. Robert
Coats, an assistant attorney general, had served as an assistant public
defender. James Singleton, an Anchorage superior court judge, had
83. Id.
84. Id. at 94. Allowing appeals as of right from the court of appeals to the
supreme court would only add to the supreme court's workload. Id.
85. Memorandum from Susan Burke, Alaska Court System Deputy Administra-
tive Director, to Arthur Snowden, II, Administrative Director, at 3 (April 6, 1979).
86. Id. at 3-5. Ms. Burke based this conclusion on the observation that criminal
merit appeals had maintained a fairly constant ratio to civil merit appeals from 1975
to 1978. Id. at 3. While she recognized that criminal sentence appeal filings had been
increasing at a greater rate than merit appeals, she did not think that the high volume
of sentence appeals would contribute significantly to the total caseload because "a
sentence appeal takes an average of 25% less court time than a merit appeal." Id.
87. Id. at 6. It was recognized that "[i]f too many of the cases within the jurisdic-
tion of the court of appeals involve areas of unsettled law, too many court of appeals
decisions will require additional review by the supreme court... [resulting in] need-
less delay... and an extreme waste of judicial resources." Id. at 2.
88. ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.010-.020 (1988).
89. Id. § 22.07.020(b).
90. Id. § 22.07.030.
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served on the Sentencing Guidelines Committee, which was estab-
lished in 1978 to explore the use of guidelines in areas not covered by
presumptive sentencing and to provide a substantive framework for
development of a common law of sentencing. These three judges, who
served together on the court of appeals for the next decade, had a
profound effect on the development of appellate sentencing law in
Alaska.91
C. Adoption of Presumptive Sentencing
Meanwhile, the Alaska Legislature in 1978 had substantially re-
written the Criminal Code, and for the first time adopted a system of
presumptive sentencing.92 Presumptive sentencing is a type of deter-
minant sentencing based on the tenet that offenders who have similar
prior criminal records and who are convicted of the same type of of-
fense are presumed to deserve the same sanction.
The Legislature's stated purpose in adopting the presumptive sen-
tencing scheme was to eliminate "unjustified disparity in sentences im-
posed on defendants convicted of similar offenses - disparity which is
not related to legally relevant sentencing criteria. ' 93 The Alaska Leg-
islature's concern over disparate sentences was prompted by studies
published by the Alaska Judicial Council describing sentencing prac-
tices in Alaska from 1974 to 1976. One study found that for all classes
of offenses, the identity of the sentencing judge was more important
than any other factor (including harm to the victim except in cases of
death, and the offender's prior record) in determining sentence
length.94 The Council also found racial disparities in sentences for
91. In May 1990, the U.S. Congress confirmed President George Bush's appoint-
ment of Judge James Singleton to the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.
Judge Singleton left the Alaska Court of Appeals on August 1, 1990. On October 11,
1990, Governor Steve Cowper appointed David Mannheimer, the assistant attorney
general in charge of the Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, to fill the vacancy
created by Judge Singleton's departure.
92. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sss. Laws 1, 120. The Criminal
Code was passed by the Legislature in 1978, but did not take effect until January 1,
1980. Id
93. Stern, supra note 53, at 228 (quoting ALASKA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, S. JOURNAL
Supp. No. 47, at 148 (June 12, 1978)). This commentary was subsequently adopted
by the Alaska House of Representatives. See ALASKA HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, ALASKA HOUSE
J. 1716 (June 16, 1978).
94. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: A




several types of offenses.95 The fact that such unjustified disparities
existed from 1974 to 1976 suggests that appellate sentence review, at
least as it had been implemented by the Alaska Supreme Court, had
not contributed significantly to the creation and enforcement of uni-
form sentencing practices.96 Thus, the Legislature was required to
take broader measures in pursuit of uniform sentencing.
The legislative decision to change Alaska's largely indeterminate
sentencing scheme to one of presumptive sentencing also might have
been influenced by a national policy shift away from rehabilitative sen-
tencing philosophy to a "just deserts" philosophy, under which offend-
ers who have committed similar offenses are sentenced similarly. The
new statutory focus on uniformity, which had been completely absent
from Alaska's former sentencing statutes and which had not played a
significant role in the supreme court's previous sentencing decisions,
was now elevated to primary importance.
VII. APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING: 1980-1990
The changes in the Alaska Criminal Code and the presumptive
sentencing scheme went into effect on January 1, 1980, eight months
before the Alaska Court of Appeals began deciding cases. Thus,
although the court of appeals may originally have been created to de-
cide cases under settled principles of law, the court was faced from its
inception with interpreting a virtually new criminal code and sentenc-
ing scheme. 97 It soon became apparent that the judges on the newly-
created court of appeals were willing to enforce the legislative empha-
sis on uniformity.
In the decade since its creation, the court of appeals' most
straightforward sentence review function has been to interpret the lan-
guage and intent of the presumptive sentencing statutes. However,
Alaska's presumptive sentencing statutes do not specify presumptive
terms for all offenses or combinations of offenses.98 For cases in which
95. The Council reported that for some classes of offenses, taking into account the
independent contribution of all other factors in the study, defendants who were mem-
bers of racial minorities were more likely than Caucasians to receive harsher
sentences, both in terms of the length of imprisonment and the likelihood of receiving
a probationary sentence. ALASKA FELONY SENTENCES, supra note 94, at v-vi, 43;
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SENTENCING IN ALASKA: A DEsCRIPION OF THE
PROCESS AND SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA FOR 1973, at 139, 175 (1975) (B.
Cutler, Research Attorney).
96. This conclusion is not surprising, since the supreme court had made it clear
from the outset that uniformity was not an important sentencing goal, and that it
would not lightly substitute its sentencing judgment for that of the trial judge.
97. For an excellent overview of Alaska's presumptive sentencing laws, see Stem,
supra note 53, at 230-39.
98. For example, presumptive sentencing does not apply to first felony offenders
convicted of class B or class C felonies unless the felony was knowingly directed at
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presumptive sentencing does not apply, the court of appeals has cre-
ated a series of benchmark or typical sentences based primarily on the
court's interpretation of the principles implicit in the presumptive sen-
tencing scheme itself. For cases in which presumptive sentencing does
apply, the court of appeals has developed an important body of case
law prescribing the extent to which presumptive terms may be ad-
justed when statutory aggravators are found.99 The court's most im-
portant decisions in these areas concern: (1) first felony offenders
convicted of class B felonies, (2) first felony offenders convicted of ag-
gravated class A felonies, (3) first felony offenders convicted of aggra-
vated cases of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual abuse of a
minor in the first degree, (4) offenders convicted of the unclassified
felony of murder in the second degree, and (5) offenders convicted of
two or more offenses before the judgment on either has been entered
(offenders subject to consecutive sentencing). The remainder of this
article focuses on the court of appeals' activity in these five areas.
A. First Felony Offenders and the Austin Guideline
When the Alaska Legislature first passed the new presumptive
sentencing scheme in 1978, it excluded from the law virtually all first
felony offenders. Although all first felony offenders convicted of class
certain public officials or emergency responders engaged in the performance of their
duties. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(3), (e)(3) (1990). Presumptive sentencing does
not apply to the unclassified felonies of murder in the first and second degrees, at-
tempted murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and misconduct involving a controlled
substance in the first degree. Id. § 12.55.125(a)-(b). Those offenses have mandatory
minimum sentences. Presumptive sentencing also does not specify total aggregate
terms for offenders who are sentenced consecutively for multiple offenses, although it
may specify a presumptive term for each separate offense. See id. § 12.55.125.
99. As the court of appeals has said:
unless a measured and restrained approach is taken in the adjustment of
presumptive sentences for both aggravating and mitigating factors, then the
prospect of attaining the statutory goal of uniform treatment for similarly
situated offi.nders would quickly be eroded, the potential for irrational dis-
parity in sentencing would threaten to become reality, and the revised code's
carefully fashioned system of escalating penalties for repeat offenders would
be rendered utterly ineffective.
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Thus, the court of appeals has held that mere proof of an aggravating or mitigat-
ing factor cannot be deemed sufficient, in and of itself, to justify an adjustment of a
presumptive term. Id. at 838. In deciding to what extent, if at all, the totality of the
aggravating and mitigating factors justify deviation from the presumptive term, courts
should apply the Chaney criteria and focus specifically on the aggravating or mitigat-
ing conduct in the particular case. Id. at 835 n.21.
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A felonies are now subject to presumptive sentencing,100 most class B
and C first felony offenders still are not.
In 1981, the Alaska Court of Appeals extended presumptive sen-
tencing principles to ensure that first felony offenders convicted of
class B and C felonies would nevertheless be directly affected by the
statutory scheme.101 In Austin v. State,10 2 the court of appeals ob-
served: "Normally, a first offender should receive a more favorable
sentence than the presumptive sentence for a second offender. It is
clear that this rule should be violated only in an exceptional case."10 3
The court of appeals does not often violate the Austin guideline.
To determine whether a first felony offender's conduct presents an
"exceptional case" justifying an upward departure from the Austin
guideline, the sentencing judge must find either aggravating factors or
the kind of extraordinary circumstances which would justify referral
of a presumptively-sentenced offender to the three-judge panel for sen-
tencing. 104 More recently, the court has concluded that the Austin
rule could be undermined unless a first felony offender is given ad-
vance notice of proposed aggravating factors, and announced that it
100. In 1982, the Legislature amended the presumptive sentencing statutes to in-
clude all first felony offenders convicted of class A felonies. Act of May 20, 1982, ch.
45, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 52 (amending ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1980)).
101. Stem, supra note 53, at 259.
102. 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 657-58. This simple principle increased substantially the number of
offenders affected by the presumptive sentencing scheme, since the majority of
Alaska's convicted offenders are first felony offenders. In 1984, for example, 43.6% of
all convicted offenders had no prior record, and 32.1% had only misdemeanor convic-
tions, leaving only 10% with one or more prior felony convictions (14.5% of con-
victed offenders had unknown prior records). ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA
FELONY SENTENCES: 1984, at 22 (1987). Data collected in connection with the Judi-
cial Council's most recent study of sentences from 1984 to 1987 indicate that of all
convicted offenders, 70.3% (N=2754) were not subject to presumptive sentencing;
persons without a prior felony record and those convicted of an unclassified offense
except sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree are not subject to presumptive sen-
tencing. The data is available from the Alaska Judicial Council library, 1029 W.
Third Ave., Suite 201, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.
104. Neakok v. State, 653 P.2d 658, 662 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted);
see also Sears v. State, 653 P.2d 349, 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). To justify referral to
a three-judge panel, the sentencing judge must find by clear and convincing evidence
that manifest injustice would result from imposing the term required by the presump-
tive sentencing statute. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.165 (1990). Manifest injustice might
result where the trial judge finds the existence of relevant non-statutory aggravating or
mitigating factors. Id.; Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
Manifest injustice also might be found if the term required by the presumptive sen-
tencing statutes, whether or not adjusted for statutory aggravating or mitigating fac-
tors, is clearly inappropriate considering the totality of the circumstances. ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.165 (1990); Dancer, 715 P.2d at 1177.
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will henceforth require prior notice to the defendant before approving
deviations from Austin.10 5
B. Benchmarks
Another device that the court of appeals uses to guide sentencing
in non-presumptive cases is the benchmark. A benchmark is a judi-
cially-created presumptive term; it is a sentencing range representing
terms imposed on similar offenders convicted of similar offenses. The
purpose of the benchmark is to "focus the attention of the trial court
and the parties on individual cases and ensure that typical cases would
receive a typical sentence and that those defendants receiving atypical
sentences would be sentenced on the basis of objective aggravating fac-
tors, not factors idiosyncratic to a specific judge." 10 6 The Alaska
Court of Appeals has articulated benchmarks for first felony offenders
sentenced for class B felonies, aggravated class A felonies, serious sex-
ual offenses, second degree murder and for consecutively-imposed
sentences.
1. First Offenders Convicted of Class B Felonies. First offenders
convicted of class B felonies are not subject to presumptive sentencing.
Second offenders face a four year presumptive term.107 Under the pre-
sumptive statute as limited by Austin, then, a first time offender con-
victed of a class B felony faces a sentence falling anywhere between
zero and foux years.
In State v. Jackson,10 8 the court of appeals divided this four-year
span for first offenders convicted of class B felonies into four distinct
subcategories defined by the seriousness of the offense and the rehabili-
tative potential of the offender. Jackson prescribes the following
benchmarks:
a. less than ninety days is the benchmark sentence for a case in-
volving significantly mitigated conduct AND an offender whose
prospects for rehabilitation are significantly better than that of the
typical first offender;
b. between ninety days and one year is the benchmark for a case
involving mitigated conduct OR an offender whose background in-
dicates particularly favorable prospects for rehabilitation;
c. one to four years to serve is the benchmark for a typical of-
fender committing a typical or moderately aggravated offense (four
years is the presumptive term for a second felony offender); and
105. Wylie v. State, No. 1063, slip op. at 20 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1990).
106. Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
107. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1990). The maximum term is ten years.
Id. § 12.55.125(d).
108. 776 P.2d 320 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
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d. up to six years is the benchmark for an offense that is exception-
ally aggravated, that is, an offense that involves significant statutory
aggravators or other extraordinarily aggravated circumstances. 109
In articulating these four benchmarks, the court made explicit the
sentencing ranges that had been implicit in prior cases involving first
felony offenders convicted of class B felonies. 110 Although the court
has said that these benchmarks are flexible,11' sentences outside these
ranges are likely to be scrutinized carefully.
2. First Offenders Convicted of Class C Felonies. The potential
range of sentences for first offenders convicted of class C felonies is
narrower than the range for those convicted of class B felonies. Since
there is no presumptive term, and since Austin would ordinarily re-
strict the upper limit to two years (the presumptive term for a second
class C felony offender' 12), the potential range is only from zero to two
years. Perhaps because the potential for disparity is not as significant
with such a small sentencing range, the court of appeals has not set
explicit benchmarks for sentencing class C felons, although it has elab-
orated on guidelines created by the supreme court.
On the low end, the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested that, in
the absence of a substantial misdemeanor record or other aggravating
factors, a first felony offender convicted of a class C felony involving a
crime against property should receive a sentence of probation, coupled
with restitution, without incarceration. 1 3 The court of appeals, how-
ever, has cautioned that a probationary sentence "will be appropriate
only if mitigating circumstances exist and the offender is a promising
candidate for rehabilitation through probationary supervision."" 4
At the upper end, the court of appeals has permitted a sentence as
high as four years with three years suspended where the conduct con-
stituting the offense was particularly serious, where, for example, the
conduct actually amounted to a class B felony." 5 It has also permit-
ted a sentence equal to the presumptive term for a second felony of-
fender (coupled with an additional one year suspended sentence)
109. I. at 326-27.
110. Id. at 326.
111. Id. at 327.
112. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1) (1990).
113. Leuch v. State, 633 P.2d 1006, 1013-14 & n.22 (Alaska 1981). A probationary
sentence is one of less than sixty days imprisonment. Sentences of less than sixty days
are often referred to as "shock probation," since the defendant is incarcerated long
enough to know what prison is like, but not long enough to be adversely affected by it.
Langton v. State, 662 P.2d 954, 959 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
114. State v. Coats, 669 P.2d 1329, 1334 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
115. Long v. State, 772 P.2d 1099 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
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where the trial court found aggravating factors that would have war-
ranted referral to a three judge sentencing panel. 116 The Alaska
Supreme Court has permitted a sentence of ten years with five years
suspended where the magnitude and manner of the crime (embezzle-
ment) were exceptional, and the crime had a "devastating effect" on
the victim, the defendant's employer.117
3. First Offenders Convicted ofAggravated Class A Felonies. First
felony offenders convicted of class A felonies are subject to a five year
presumptive term. 118 First offenders who commit the most aggravated
class A offenses face terms ranging from the five year presumptive
term to the twenty year maximum term.119 Within this framework,
the court of appeals has set a benchmark upper limit of ten years on
the extent to which sentences for first offenders convicted of aggra-
vated class A felonies may be increased. 120 Offenses may be aggra-
vated by the offender's prior history, the circumstances of the offense,
or by simultaneous convictions for more than one offense.1 21 In estab-
lishing this benchmark, the court analyzed past sentencing practices
and looked to the standards of the American Bar Association, which
recommended against periods of incarceration for more than ten
years, except in exceptional cases.' 22
116. Hads v. State, 727 P.2d 11, 12-13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
117. Karr v. State, 686 P.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Alaska 1984).
118. ALASr.A STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(1) (1990). If the offense is other than man-
slaughter and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or
caused serious physical injury during the offense, or knowingly directed the conduct
constituting the offense at a uniformed officer or emergency responder engaged in the
performance of official duties, the presumptive term is seven years. Id.
§ 12.55.125(c)(2).
119. Id. § 12.55.125(c).
120. DeGross v. State, 768 P.2d 134, 139-40 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Lawrence v.
State, 764 P.2d 318, 321 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353,
1356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Williams v. State, 759 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1988); Pruett v. State, 742 P.2d 257, 264-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
121. Increasing the presumptive sentence requires two determinations. First, the
trial judge must determine whether the aggravating factor has been established by
clear and convincing evidence; second, the trial court must exercise its discretion to
determine whether the factor justifies an increase in the presumptive term. Jones v.
State, 771 P.2d 462, 467 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30, 32
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (modified opinion).
122. Towsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). The ABA
Standards state that for most offenses, the maximum authorized prison term ought not
to exceed ten years except in unusual cases, and normally should not exceed five years.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES,
Part II, § 2.1(d) (approved draft 1968). The ABA Standards suggest that confinement
for the maximumn period is appropriate when the court finds that such confinement is
necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct, and that the defendant
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The court of appeals has acknowledged that lengthy terms of im-
prisonment should not be imposed for purposes of rehabilitating an
offender and that they will seldom be necessary for deterrence or com-
munity condemnation. 123 The court of appeals is thus reluctant to ap-
prove sentences in excess of ten years even in cases involving
convictions for multiple counts of robbery. 124 This ten year bench-
mark limit for first-time class A felons is also consistent with Austin,
because the presumptive term for a second offender convicted of a
class A felony is ten years. 25
4. Sexual Assault I and Sexual Abuse of a Minor . Since 1982,
all offenders convicted of sexual assault in the first degree126 or sexual
abuse of a minor in the first degree 27 have been subject to presumptive
sentencing.128 The presumptive term for a first felony offender is eight
years 129; a second felony offender faces fifteen years; and a third felony
offender faces twenty-five years.' 30
previously has been convicted of two felonies committed on different occasions. Id.
§ 3.3(b), (b)(i).
The court of appeals' ten year benchmark is being challenged in a case now on
appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, Wentz v. State, 777 P.2d 213 (Alaska Ct. App.
1989), petition for hearing granted, No. S-3498 (Alaska Oct. 9, 1989). In this appeal,
the state has argued in part that the Alaska Legislature implicitly rejected the ABA
Standard when it enacted some presumptive terms greater than 10 years. Petitioner's
Brief at 16.
123. DeGross v. State, 768 P.2d 134, 140 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (discussing Pears
v. State, 698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985)).
124. Id. (discussing Hale v. State, 764 P.2d 313 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Townsel,
763 P.2d 1353; Williams v. State, 759 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)). One excep-
tion to the 10 year benchmark applies to cases involving premeditated attempts to kill
or seriously injure. Pruett v. State, 742 P.2d 257, 264 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). See,
eg., Marzak v. State, No. 1068, slip. op. at 6 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990);
Burleson v. State, 543 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1975).
125. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(3) (1990).
126. See id. § 11.41.410 (Supp. 1989) (defining sexual assault in the first degree).
127. See id. § 11.41.434 (Supp. 1989) (defining sexual abuse of a minor in the first
degree).
128. Id. § 12.55.125(i) (1990).
129. The eight year term became effective on October 1, 1982; before then, the
presumptive term was the five to seven years applicable to the other class A felonies.
Act effective Oct. 1, 1982, ch. 143, § 30, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 451, 475 (amending
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1980)).
130. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i)(1)-(4) (1990). If the offense is a first felony con-
viction and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused




The term of a first offender who has established a statutory miti-
gator could be reduced by as many as four years.1 31 If the state estab-
lishes an aggravator, however, the statute permits a sentence ranging
from the presumptive term to the maximum thirty years. 132
Many cases involving sexual assault or sexual abuse of a minor in
the first degree are aggravated in the sense that they involve either
multiple assaults on the same victim occurring over a protracted pe-
riod of time, or multiple victims or both. This is especially true in
cases of sexual abuse of a minor, which almost invariably involve
many separate incidents of penetration of one or more victims,
whether or riot there is actually a plea to multiple counts.133
The court of appeals has expressed concern that an offender who
has engaged in a continuous course of sexual abuse but who is charged
with and pleads to a single count of first degree sexual assault theoreti-
cally could be sentenced differently than an offender who has engaged
in a similar course of conduct but who is convicted of multiple
counts. 134 To ensure that offenders who have engaged in similar con-
duct are sentenced similarly, regardless of the prosecutor's decision of
how many counts to charge, the court of appeals has instructed the
sentencing judge to consider the totality of the defendant's conduct to
the extent that it is verified in the record.135
In addition, the court of appeals has articulated a benchmark up-
per limit of ten to fifteen years for first offenders convicted in aggra-
vated cases of sexual assault and sexual abuse of a minor. 136 The court
defines aggravated cases as those that involve multiple victims, multi-
ple assaults on a single victim or serious injuries to one or more vic-
tims; such cases usually will be considered aggravated whether or not
there is actually a plea to multiple counts. 137 Other factors that can
aggravate cases of sexual assault or sexual abuse of a minor include the
131. Id § 12.55.155(a)(2). Where the presumptive term is greater than four years,
factors in mitigation can reduce the sentence by as much as one half. Id.
132. Id §§ 12.55.155(a)(2), 12.55.125(i).
133. State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 912-13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 723
P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986).
134. Id The offender who is convicted of multiple counts is subject to consecutive
sentencing. For further explanation of the circumstances under which sentences may
be imposed consecutively, see infra section VI and accompanying notes.
135. Andrew; 707 P.2d at 912-13.
136. Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Covington v. State,
747 P.2d 550 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Mosier v. State, 747 P.2d 548 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987); Hancock v. State, 741 P.2d 1210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Soper v. State, 731
P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986).
137. Andrews, 707 P.2d at 913.
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age of the victim 138 and conduct that continues for a long period of
time.139
First offender sentences in excess of the ten to fifteen year bench-
mark are appropriate only in exceptional circumstances. 140 In order
to exceed the benchmark, the trial judge must make an express finding
that the defendant cannot be rehabilitated or deterred within a lesser
period of time.141 In this context, the court of appeals has occasion-
ally approved sentences totalling as many as twenty-five years with five
years suspended; but these have been exceptionally aggravated
cases. 142 The court also once held that a "particularly serious of-
fender" could receive as many as forty years. 143
5. Unclassified Felonies. The unclassified felonies which are non-
presumptive are murder in the first and second degrees, attempted
murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and misconduct involving a
controlled substance in the first degree. The statutory sentencing
range for first degree murder is between twenty and ninety-nine years;
the statutory range for the rest of these offenses is between five and
ninety-nine years. 144
Within the extremely broad statutory ranges for these serious of-
fenses, the court of appeals has clearly articulated a benchmark for
second degree murder: twenty to thirty years. 45 The court arrived at
138. See Zackar v. State, 761 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
139. See Lewis v. State, 706 P.2d 715, 717 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
140. Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Hancock v.
State, 741 P.2d 1210, 1214-15 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
141. Hancock, 741 P.2d at 1213-14.
142. See, ag., Howell v. State, 758 P.2d 103, 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Lewis,
706 P.2d at 717.
143. Hancock, 741 P.2d at 1214-15.
144. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)-(b) (1990).
145. State v. Krieger, 731 P.2d 592, 595 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Page v. State, 657
P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). This 20 to 30 year benchmark is internally
consistent with the court's 10 to 15 year benchmark for aggravated class A felonies
and its 15 year benchmark for aggravated sexual assaults: the court regards crimes
involving loss of life as the most serious offenses.
In 1988, Judge Singleton suggested that the court also adopt a 10 to 15 year
benchmark for composite sentences imposed in cases involving convictions for kidnap-
ping combined with other serious offenses. Garrison v. State, 762 P.2d 465, 471-74
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Singleton, J., concurring). Judge Singleton further suggested
that for policy reasons composite sentences in excess of 20 years be limited to cases
involving obscured murder (cases in which the kidnapping obscured the circum-
stances of the killing), kidnapping for ransom, terrorist kidnapping for political or
social advantage, and enslavement. Id. at 472. Judge Singleton reconciled these two
suggested benchmarks with terms imposed in previous cases by explaining that offend-
ers "convicted of offenses involving both rape and kidnapping who received sentences
in excess of the ten- to fifteen-year benchmark for aggravated rape have usually been
felony recidivists." Id at 473 (citation omitted).
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this range by surveying second-degree murder cases decided since
1970.146 In approving such a significant term of imprisonment, the
court acknowledges that deterrence of others and affirmation of com-
munity norms remain the primary sentencing criteria for intentional
killings. 147
Although the court has warned that any sentence substantially
exceeding the second degree murder benchmark "would appear at
least provisionally suspect," 148 the court further explained in State v.
Krieger1 49 that a person who commits second degree murder under
circumstances approximating first degree murder may receive an ag-
gravated sentence, while one who commits second degree murder
under circumstances approximating manslaughter may receive a miti-
gated sentence.1 50 In typical cases, however, the twenty to thirty year
benchmark still applies.151
The court of appeals has not significantly limited sentencing dis-
cretion for the other unclassified felonies. Like the supreme court, the
court of appeals seems unwilling to interfere unduly with sentences for
serious offenses characterized by extreme physical violence. For ex-
ample, the court of appeals will approve the maximum penalty of
ninety-nine years for first degree murder contract killings, even where
the offender has no substantial prior record. 152 Moreover, the court
has held that consecutive ninety-nine year sentences for first degree
murder are not necessarily excessive.153 In first degree murder cases,
the "inherent seriousness of the offense will almost invariably require
that the goals of isolation of the offender, general deterrence, and com-
munity condemnation be given a prominent role in sentencing." 15 4
146. Page, 657 P.2d at 855.
147. Krieger, 731 P.2d at 595.
148. Page, 657 P.2d at 855.
149. 731 P.2d 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
150. Id. at 596. See also Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261, 1273-74 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985) (court upheld a 99 year sentence for second degree murder where defend-
ant was a worst offender and exhibited a "pattern of cruel and violent behavior to
others").
151. Krieger, 731 P.2d at 596.
152. Mathi;s v. State, 778 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Ridgely v. State,
739 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Lewis v. State, 731 P.2d 68, 72-73
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951, 953 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986);
Hoover v. State, 641 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
153. Nukapigak v. State, 663 P.2d 943, 946 (Alaska 1983) (consecutive 99 year
terms permissible in exceptional cases as long as sentence is otherwise in accordance
with sentencing criteria), questioned in Collins v. State, 778 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1989) (Singleton, J., concurring).
154. Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951, 952-53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
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C. Consecutive and Concurrent Sentencing
1. Statutory Framework. Before enactment of the Revised Crimi-
nal Code in 1980, Alaska's consecutive sentencing statute, Alaska
Statutes section 11.05.050, gave judges unlimited discretion to impose
consecutive sentences on defendants convicted of two or more crimes
before judgment on either had been entered.'5 5 Case law interpreting
this statute permitted consecutive sentences for distinct crimes.' 56
However, neither the Alaska Legislature nor the Alaska Supreme
Court established any guidelines concerning the imposition of consec-
utive rather than concurrent sentences.
In 1980, the Legislature replaced Alaska Statutes section
11.05.050 with a similar statute.' 57 The new statute provided in part
that before judgment was entered a defendant convicted of two or
more crimes could be sentenced either consecutively or concurrently,
as the court provided. 158 The court of appeals, noting the general sim-
ilarity between the old and the new statute, concluded that the new
law did not change the situations in which a sentencing court was per-
mitted to impose consecutive sentences.' 5 9
The current versions of Alaska Statutes section 12.55.025(e) and
(g) were adopted in 1982.160 Under section 12.55.025(e), an offender
who is convicted of two or more crimes before the judgment on either
has been entered "shall" be sentenced consecutively, subject to the six
exceptions listed in section 12.55.025(g).' 61
155. ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.050 (1962) (repealed 1978).
156. Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856, 859 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (dictum),
modified, Jones v. State, 744 P.2d 410, 411-12 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). For further
discussion of Jones, see infra section VI and accompanying notes.
157. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.025 (1980).
158. Id.
159. Lacquement, 644 P.2d at 859.
160. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, §§ 24-25, 42, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 23, 30.
161. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.025(g), (e) (1990). The first three subparagraphs in
section 12.55.025(g) concern situations in which multiple offenses grow out of the
same or a connected transaction or are closely related in time. Thus, the trial judge
may sentence concurrently if the crimes violate similar societal interests, the crimes
are part of a single, continuous criminal episode, or there was not a substantial change
in the objective of the criminal episode, including a change in the parties to the crime,
the property or type of property right offended, or the persons offended. Id.
§ 12.55.025(g)(1)-(3). The last three subparagraphs in (g) provide that concurrent
sentences may be given as long as the crimes were not committed while the defendant
was trying to escape, or as long as the sentences are not for the crimes of homicide,
assault, kidnapping, and sexual offenses, or are not for the crimes of robbery or extor-
tion resulting in physical injury. Id. § 12.55.025(g)(4)-(6).
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The court of appeals first interpreted these 1982 changes in State
v. Andrews,1 62 concluding that section 12.55.025(e) expresses a legisla-
tive preference for consecutive sentences, subject to the exceptions
listed in section 12.55.025(g). While the Andrews court recognized the
legislative preference for consecutive sentences, it nevertheless inter-
preted the exceptions to that preference to permit imposition of con-
current sentences in almost every case. 163 The court decided that the
trial judge could reject the legislative preference and impose concur-
rent sentenoes if the conduct satisfied any one of the six subparagraphs
in section 12.55.025(g).164 In other words, each subparagraph is an
independent basis for permitting concurrent sentences.165
Of course, a defendant who qualifies for concurrent sentences
under section 12.55.025(g) is not necessarily entitled to them. In the
court of appeals' interpretation of that section, the sentencing judge
will seldom be required to impose sentences consecutively, but retains
a certain amount of discretion to do so. The court of appeals has cho-
sen to restrict the judge's consecutive sentencing discretion by formu-
lating benchmarks that control the extent to which sentences may be
imposed consecutively. 166
2. Judicially-Imposed Limits on Consecutive Sentences. One im-
portant test for evaluating the appropriateness of all consecutively-im-
posed sentences focuses not on the length of the individual consecutive
increments, but on the total aggregate term. The court of appeals re-
quires that the total consecutive term be justified under the Chaney
standards.1 67
In addition to the Chaney standards, the court uses benchmarks
to evaluate the appropriateness of a defendant's total sentence. One
important benchmark that limits the extent to which sentences may be
162. 707 P.2d 900, 902 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd per curiam 723 P.2d 85
(Alaska 1986).
163. 707 P.2d at 906.
164. Id. at 908.
165. Id. at 905. Thus, a defendant convicted of multiple sexual assaults against
different victims during an eight month period cannot benefit from the subparagraph
that makes concurrent sentences available to those who are not convicted of such
offenses (subparagraph (g)(5)), but he can qualify for concurrent sentences because his
crimes involved similar societal interests (subparagraph (g)(1)), were not committed
while escaping (subparagraph (g)(4)), and did not involve the circumstances set forth
in subparagraph (g)(6). Id. at 908.
166. The court of appeals has criticized the 1980 version of section 12.55.025(e) as
being a "major loophole in the presumptive sentencing scheme," because the unfet-
tered discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences severely undercuts the
sentencing goals of uniformity and freedom from unwarranted disparity. Clifton v.
State, 758 P.2d 1279, 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
167. Contreras v. State, 767 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). For discus-
sion of the Chaney standards, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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imposed consecutively is whether the total sentence, including consec-
utive increments, exceeds the presumptive term for the single most
serious offense.
In 1982, in Lacquement v. State,168 the court of appeals an-
nounced that where the trial judge imposes consecutive presumptive
terms, but the aggregate of the consecutive terms exceeds the pre-
sumptive term for the most serious single offense, the trial judge must
make an affirmative finding that confining the defendant f6r the aggre-
gate period of the consecutive term is necessary to protect the pub-
lic. 169 Noting that the decision to impose consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences clearly affects the total sentence imposed, the
court required that such a consecutive term be justified by the Chaney
goal of isolation. 70
The court of appeals has recently developed an important excep-
tion to the Lacquement requirements of a special finding of public dan-
ger and the need for isolation. In cases where the total of the
consecutive terms imposed does not exceed ten years, a total term ex-
ceeding the presumptive term for the most serious single offense can be
based on sentencing goals other than isolation.' 71
The court of appeals introduced this exception in Jones v.
State,17 2 and reiterated it in Farmer v. State. 73 In Jones, the defend-
ant was convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter and re-
ceived consecutive presumptive sentences totalling twice the
presumptive term for the single most serious count. 174 The trial judge
had found that the harsh sentence was necessary to reflect the crime's
seriousness and deter others. 175 Judge Coats believed that the sentenc-
ing goals cited by the trial judge were sufficient to justify a sentence
exceeding the five year presumptive term, even where there was no
finding of public danger.176
In Farmer, Judge Bryner, this time writing for the court, cited
Jones and explained that the court would no longer read Lacquement
168. 644 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
169. Id. at 862. As Judge Coats noted in Clifton v. State, Lacquement essentially
applied the reasoning of an earlier Alaska Supreme Court case, Mutschler v. State,
560 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1977), to the presumptive sentencing statutes. Clifton, 758 P.2d
1279, 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
170. Bolhouse v. State, 687 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
171. See DeGross v. State, 768 P.2d 134, 140 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
172. 744 P.2d 410 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
173. 746 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
174. Jones, 744 P.2d at 411.
175. Id. at 412.
176. Id. Although Judge Coats agreed with the trial judge's reasoning, he voted to
reduce Jones' sentence by two years, from 10 years to 10 years with two years sus-
pended. Judge Coats' opinion suggested that the 1982 amendments to section
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inflexibly. 177 Judge Bryner announced that "the appropriate focus is
no longer on the narrow issue of public danger, but rather on whether
a composite sentence exceeding the presumptive term is warranted
under the totality of the circumstances." 178 Farmer had argued that
his sentence, which exceeded the two year presumptive term by eleven
months of uasuspended time, should have been based on an express
finding of necessity. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the
sentence was justified by the seriousness of the offenses. 179
In Clifton v. State, °80 the court further clarified the rule of Jones
and Farmer, explaining that because the Legislature in 1982 had
amended section 12.55.025(e) to express a preference for consecutive
sentences, the court would henceforth require only "substantial rea-
sons" to justify consecutive terms exceeding the presumptive term for
the single most serious offense.18 1 In Clifton, the court affirmed a com-
posite sentence of twelve years with two years suspended, where the
presumptive sentence for the most serious count, sexual abuse of a
minor in the first degree, was eight years and the maximum was thirty
years. 8 2
Where the consecutive terms exceed ten years, however, the court
of appeals will apparently continue to apply Lacquement apparently
more rigidly. Thus, where the composite term exceeds the presump-
tive for the single most serious count, or exceeds ten years of unsus-
pended time, the court continues to require a specific finding that there
12.55.025(e) (substituting a preference for consecutive sentences) legislatively super-
seded Lacquement's requirement that the decision to sentence consecutively be based
on the goal of isolation. Id at 411.
Judge Singleton's concurring opinion resisted this suggestion, insisting that the
questions of what total sentence is appropriate and whether that sentence should con-
sist of consecutive increments or concurrent segments are independent of each other,
and that "a sentence that would be inappropriate when viewed as a sentence for the
most serious offense, does not automatically become appropriate simply because it is
comprised of multiple sentences that were imposed consecutively." Id. at 415 (Single-
ton, J., concurring). Judge Singleton agreed with Judge Coats, however, that Jones'
sentence should be reduced to 10 years with two years suspended. Id. at 414 (Single-
ton, J., concurring).
Judge Bryner objected in dissent to his colleagues' apparent conclusion that a first
felony offender convicted of drunk driving and multiple manslaughter counts enjoys a
sentence ceiling of eight years. Id. at 415 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
177. Farmer, 746 P.2d at 1301. Apparently, the court had resolved the initial disa-
greement reflected in Jones.
178. Id. at 1301-02.
179. Id. at 1302 (Farmer's convictions arose from a car crash in which one person
was killed and -two others were injured).
180. 758 P.2d 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
181. Id. at 1286.
182. Id. at 1285-86.
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is an actual need to isolate the defendant for the protection of the com-
munity for the full period in question.18 3
A second benchmark limiting consecutive sentences is related to
the supreme court's general rule that the maximum sentence generally
should not be imposed unless the court determines that the offender is
a "worst offender" for that class of crime.'84 The court of appeals has
held that offenders who are characterized as "worst offenders" and
"dangerous offenders" require sentences emphasizing the goals of de-
terrence, reaffirmation of societal norms, and isolation for the protec-
tion of the public.185 A finding that a defendant is a "worst offender"
can justify imposition of consecutive sentences equal to the maximum
term for the single most serious count. 8 6
To arrive at a finding of worst offender status, the trial court must
look to the manner in which the crime was committed and to the char-
acter and background of the defendant.'8 7 Factors considered in the
determination of the offender's character and background include the
defendant's prior convictions, age, military records, employment his-
tory, substance addiction, presentence report, dangerous propensities
and the possibility that the defendant has an antisocial personality.'
"Worst offender" status, however, does not automatically permit
imposition of consecutive sentences exceeding the maximum for the
single most serious crime.'8 9 The court of appeals has repeatedly held
that in order to impose such a term, the trial court must specifically
183. See, ag., Castle v. State, 767 P.2d 219, 222 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
184. See State v. Wortham, 537 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975); Galaktionoff v.
State, 486 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1971).
185. Bumpus v. State, 776 P.2d 329, 333 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989), petition for hear-
ing granted, No. S-3463 (Alaska Oct. 9, 1989).
186. Id, at 334-35; DeGross v. State, 768 P.2d 134, 140 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989);
Heacock v. State, 762 P.2d 503, 505 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
187. Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska 1981).
188. State v. Wortham, 537 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975). Care must be taken to
distinguish between the notion of "worst offender" and the statutory aggravator con-
tained in section 12.55.155(c)(10). See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(10) (1990) ("the
conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious conduct included in the
definition of the offense"). "Worst offender" status can be established by the personal
characteristics of the offender, or by the particular conduct involved in the offense, or
by both. Wortham, 537 P.2d at 1120. This is distinct from the statutory aggravator,
which is established only by the seriousness of the offender's conduct. The Legisla-
ture's enactment of statutory aggravators did not replace the concept of "worst
offender."
189. Bumpus, 776 P.2d at 335; DeGross, 768 P.2d at 140.
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find, in addition to the "worst offender" designation, that the defend-
ant will continue to pose a danger to the community during the ex-
tended term and that his continued isolation is actually necessary.1 90
Such sentences "cannot be justified by considerations of rehabilitation,
deterrence of self or others, or reaffirmation of community norms."'' 91
Thus, a first offender convicted of multiple class A felonies should not
be given sentences exceeding the twenty year maximum unless the trial
judge first determines that such a term is actually necessary for the
protection of the community and that "the [defendant] can neither be
rehabilitated nor deterred" by a shorter sentence. 192
Finally, the court of appeals has formulated specific benchmark
terms which the trial judge should not exceed when sentencing offend-
ers convicted of multiple counts of certain types of serious crimes. For
example, a thirty year benchmark applies if the offender has a nonvio-
lent record and is convicted of multiple counts of serious felonies in-
volving substantial violence.' 93 There is a forty year benchmark for
persons with felony records involving crimes of violence who commit
multiple serious felonies involving substantial violence. 194 The court
of appeals also has applied the forty year benchmark to the case of a
violent sexual offender who had a substantial nonviolent criminal rec-
ord but also had a history of violent behavior. 195 The upper limit for
criminal conduct short of murder is probably a composite sentence
similar to the fifty three years given in Wortham v. State. 96
3. 1988 Amendment to Alaska Statutes Section 12.55.025. In
1988, the Legislature added subparagraph (h) to Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 12.55.02:5.197 That section requires judges to impose some consec-
utive period of incarceration for each sexual or physical assault against
a child. 198 While it was not the Legislature's intent to restrict the
court's discretion in determining the length of the consecutive terms,
190. Bumpus, 776 P.2d at 335; DeGross, 768 P.2d at 140; Heacock, 762 P.2d at
505; Hancock v. State, 741 P.2d 1210, 1214 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). See also
Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1977) (Erwin, J., dissenting).
191. Newell v. State, 771 P.2d 873, 878 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (Singleton, J.,
dissenting on other grounds). See also DeGross, 768 P.2d at 140-41 n.1 (noting that
composite sentences exceeding 10 years must be based on the need for isolation).
192. DeGross, 768 P.2d at 141.
193. See Hancock v. State, 741 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Tookak v.
State, 648 P.2d 1018, 1023-24 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
194. See Hancock, 741 P.2d at 1212; Wortham v. State, 689 P.2d 1133, 1145 n.7
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 595, 600 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
195. Hancock, 741 P.2d at 1215.
196. 689 P.2d 1133 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); see also Murray v. State, 770 P.2d
1131, 1140-41 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (discussing limits upon composite sentences).
197. Act effective May 28, 1988, ch. 66, §§ 5, 6, 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws 4.
198. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.025(h) (1990).
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the Legislature did wish to express its preference for "judges to impose
some consecutive period of time so as to reflect the community's ab-
horrence of these types of offenses, and to bring home to the offender
that some additional penalty must be paid for each and every proven
offense."1 99
It is not clear what effect, if any, the 1988 amendment has had or
will have on sentencing practices. Since at least 1985 the court of ap-
peals has endorsed the principle that a person who commits multiple
sexual assaults should receive a more severe sentence than a person
convicted of a single assault.200
Moreover, even assuming that the 1988 amendment would cause
the trial court judges to impose consecutive sentences more frequently
for sexual assaults against minors, the total term imposed, including
consecutive increments, would continue to be limited by the court of
appeals' benchmarks and by the requirement that total terms be justi-
fied under the Chaney standards. Thus it is not clear that the 1988
amendment has caused, or will cause total sentences to become appre-
ciably longer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals, which has decided well over 1,100 sentence
appeals since its creation in 1980,201 has adopted the role envisioned
by the original proponents of appellate review. It routinely reduces
excessive sentences to bring them in line with sentences given in com-
parable cases, and has created an extensive body of case law articulat-
ing appropriate sentencing principles, establishing benchmark terms
for many classes of offenses, and establishing standards for the extent
to which sentences can be increased in aggravated cases. In addition,
the court of appeals has moved to close a major loophole in the pre-
sumptive sentencing scheme by regulating the total aggregate terms
that may be imposed for offenders who are sentenced consecutively.
By virtue of the volume and completeness of the sentencing law that it
has created, the Alaska Court of Appeals is one of the most active
sentence review courts in the nation.20 2
199. House Letter of Intent, 1988 H. JOURNAL 2331 (February 24, 1988).
200. See State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 910 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff'd per
curiam, 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986).
201. See ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, at 5-9; id., 1987 AN-
NUAL REPORT, at 5-9; id., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, at 5-9; id., 1982 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, at 5-9.
202. By way of comparison, Minnesota's appellate courts decided less than half as
many sentence appeals during their first seven years of reviewing presumptive
sentences than the Alaska Court of Appeals decided in its first seven years. Comment-
ing in 1987 upon the number of sentence appeals decided by Minnesota's courts,
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There are drawbacks, however, to relying too heavily on appellate
review to articulate sentencing principles and to fine-tune sentences.
Appellate review by its very nature is backward-looking. It is the
proper role of the appellate court to examine what has occurred in a
specific case, and to pass on the propriety of the result in that case
only. It is generally accepted that an appellate court is effective only
when it dec:ides cases based on the factual record before it and only
after the record in that case has been completely developed. As a rule,
it cannot and should not anticipate what other factual situations might
arise in the future, nor should it fashion rules prospectively.
We have seen in the course of the previous analysis that the court
of appeals, while willing to take its sentence reviewing function quite
seriously, creates target benchmarks by looking back and reviewing
sentences previously approved in similar cases. It then synthesizes all
the cases in that area, often publishing a decision making explicit the
reasoning implicit in its previous decisions. While this is entirely ap-
propriate behavior for an appellate court, it means that the court of
appeals cannot shape sentencing law prospectively, because it cannot
choose the cases that come before it, and it cannot decide cases with
an eye to what might happen in the future. In addition, the court's
process of deciding numerous cases in an area and then publishing a
decision distilling the general principle is often confusing to the practi-
tioner, who is sometimes left with dozens of cases and no concrete
rule.
It is the function of a legislature to shape law prospectively. Be-
sides being able to look forward, a legislature can establish sentencing
policy in the context of other considerations, such as the overall allo-
cation of the state's resources. This legislative function complements
the appellate courts' review of individual cases and synthesis of the
individual decisions into a comprehensive set of interpretations of the
statutes and constitution.
However, legislatures face at least two difficulties when called
upon to write specific punishments for crimes. First, legislatures sel-
dom have the time needed to create the original law, nor do they have
the time necessary to review the law and make appropriate changes
once it has gone into effect. 20 3 Second, it has been said that "legisla-
tors have considerable incentives to adopt posturing stances of 'tough-
ness' and few incentives for giving thought to the justice of proposed
penalties .... -204 One solution is to have legislatures delegate some of
Michael Tonry predicted that Minnesota would become "the first American jurisdic-
tion to have a meaningful system of appellate sentence review." Tonry, supra note 25,
at 42.




their rule-making ability to a sentencing commission that has both the
time and the representation from a variety of interest groups necessary
to generate responsible sentencing policies. Like the legislature, the
sentencing commission's mission is prospective: to decide the future
direction of sentencing policy.
A sentencing commission was established in Alaska during the
1989-90 legislative term.205 Alaska's Sentencing Commission is com-
posed of fourteen representatives from many different interest groups.
Its purpose is to evaluate the effect of sentencing laws and practices on
the criminal justice system, and to make recommendations for improv-
ing criminal sentencing practices.
As Andrew von Hirsch has explained, a useful first step in any
sentencing commission's work is the study of past sentencing prac-
tices,20 6 like those conducted by the Alaska Court of Appeals. How-
ever, the task should not end there. The commission also should make
a normative evaluation of those past practices. A normative evalua-
tion is not limited to a decision about whether the existing presump-
tive terms are fair, although certainly that should be a part of the
process. Alaska's Sentencing Commission must ask whether past sen-
tencing practices have been based on coherent and articulated sentenc-
ing goals and philosophies, and if they have, it must clearly define the
goals and rank them in order of importance. It also must decide what
effects past practices have had on the criminal justice system in terms
of prison overcrowding, and to what extent, if at all, prison over-
crowding should be taken into account when formulating presumptive
terms. Alaska's Sentencing Commission, and Alaska's Legislature,
should resist the impulse to limit sentence reform to tinkering with
presumptive terms or making surface changes in the existing statutes,
such as bringing class B and C first felony offenders under presumptive
sentencing.207
Appellate review of sentencing has profoundly changed sentenc-
ing policy in Alaska during the two decades since its inception. The
Chaney guidelines set by the Alaska Supreme Court in the first decade
are not only applied to every sentencing decision, but were incorpo-
rated by the Legislature into its statement of sentencing policy during
the revision of the criminal code. In the second decade of sentence
205. H.B. 491 (Judiciary), 16th Leg., 2d Sess. (1990). The Alaska Sentencing
Commission had its first meeting in August of 1990. It is scheduled to make its rec-
ommendations to the Legislature over the next three years.
206. Von Hirsch, supra note 27, at 7.
207. In his 1985 article, Professor Barry Stern argues that excluding first-time B
and C felony offenders from the presumptive sentencing scheme results in disparate
amounts of time to serve, because offenders sentenced non-presumptively can be pa-
roled, while offenders sentenced presumptively cannot. Stern, supra note 53, at 259-
64.
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review, the appellate courts' decision to determine the justice of non-
presumptive sentences by referring to the presumptive sentencing
structure has had far-reaching effects on the entire criminal justice sys-
tem.20 8 The third decade of appellate review of sentencing should see
the interaction of the decisions made over the past twenty years with
new policies recommended by the Sentencing Commission to the Leg-
islature and the courts. The past experience suggests that the appel-
late courts will continue to use their authority to participate actively in
the shaping of Alaska's sentencing practices.
208. The Alaska Judicial Council's most recent analysis of sentences imposed in
Alaska between 1984 and 1987 indicates that the variable of judge identity no longer
makes a significant contribution to the mean active sentence length. CARNS &
KRUSE, supra note 69, ch. III. The lack of importance of this variable probably re-
flects the combined contributions of presumptive sentencing and the appellate courts'
guidelines and benchmarks. Id.
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